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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW—CERCLA ENFORCEMENT:
TERMINOLOGY AND MEANING OF “TREATMENT” ARRANGER
LIABILITY
Daniel J. DePasquale *
CERCLA arranger liability was forever changed by the
Supreme Court decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry.
Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599 (2009). In the aftermath,
EPA has been hamstrung with the difficulty of substantiating a
Potentially Responsible Party’s (“PRP”) intent to arrange for
disposal of a hazardous substance, as well as attempting to
overcome the ever-increasing scientific capabilities of PRPs to
demonstrate that proportionality of damages is appropriate for
a given Superfund site. This Article is the first in depth analysis
teasing apart what it means for a PRP to arrange for disposal, as
opposed to arrange for treatment—both found under CERCLA
§ 107(a)(3)—and to establish that the use of the treatment
terminology could strengthen the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (“EPA”) enforcement efficiency and effectiveness.
In particular, this Article opines on the following: (1) Congress
included the treatment term because the treatment of
hazardous substances inherently generate the possibility of
Superfund sites; (2) Congress intended liability to attach to the
transferor anytime the selling party intends—whether implicitly
or explicitly—to alter the hazardous substance through some
process to make it more useful or reuseable, and that process
was the proximate cause of the release of hazardous waste at
the site; and (3) attaching liability under the treatment term is
an easier standard to meet and would result in an increased
percentage of successful CERCLA enforcement actions and
contribution claims. To illustrate, this Article discusses two
real-world scenarios in an effort to shed light on situations in
which treatment arranger liability could and should be utilized
as a litigation tactic over disposal arranger liability.
*
2016 Western New England University School of Law, graduate. I would like to
thank the members of the Western New England Law Review for their hard work and
diligence during the editing process. A special thank you, as well, to my family for their
unwavering support and encouragement.
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INTRODUCTION
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act1 (“CERCLA” or “Superfund”) is a highly
developed statutory scheme passed by Congress in 1980. This
legislation was enacted to address health and environmental risks
resulting from continuing industrial pollution from chemical spills
and increasing amounts of abandoned hazardous dump sites.2
CERCLA empowers the President “to command government
agencies and private parties to clean up hazardous waste sites.”3
The statute holds all Potentially Responsible Parties (“PRP”)
strictly liable, many of them by way of joint and several liability.4
Section 107(a) of CERCLA sets out the means by which a
person or corporate entity can be found liable for cleanup costs of
hazardous waste sites.5 Liability attaches to the following: (1) the
current owner or operator of the contaminated premises; (2) the
owner or operator of the contaminated premises at the time of the
disposal of the hazardous substance; (3) generators and parties who
arranged for treatment or disposal of hazardous substances; and (4)
transporters that select the disposal site.6 These categories can be
discussed endlessly, as each is more complicated than meets the
eye. Nevertheless, the focus of this Article is on the third
category—arranger liability.7 More specifically, this Article will
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
§§ 101–175, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2014) [hereinafter CERCLA §§ 101–175].
2. See id.; United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55 (1998); Exxon Corp. v.
Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 358–59 (1986). The statute was enacted in direct response to Love
Canal, in Niagara, New York, and the Valley of Drums in Brooks, Kentucky. See
GIBBS M. LOIS, LOVE CANAL: MY STORY (Grove Press, 1982); see also EPA
Superfund Program: A.L. Taylor (Valley of Drums), Brooks, KY, ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY,
http://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/cursites/csitinfo.cfm?id=0402072
(last
visited Mar. 4, 2016).
3. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994); see CERCLA
§§ 101–175.
4. See generally CERCLA §§ 101–175. CERCLA does not explicitly state that
there is joint and several liability; however, courts have readily implemented it as per
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A
(AM. LAW INST. 1965); see, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802,
802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (explaining how there were joint and several liability provisions
in Senate CERCLA drafts previously and how those provisions were stripped with the
final amendments to the bill in order to put the emphasis on common law principles to
determine on a case-by-case basis when a party should be held joint and severally
liable).
5. CERCLA § 107(a).
6. CERCLA § 107(a); see generally Tippins Inc. v. USX Corp., 37 F.3d 87 (3d
Cir. 1994) (clarifying transporter liability within CERCLA).
7. See CERCLA § 107(a)(3).
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delve into what it means to arrange for treatment of hazardous
waste.8 The topic of treatment-based arranger liability is rather
unique, as most articles—and cases for that matter—tackle
arranger liability through the lens of disposal.9 There is a dearth of
academic scholarship on treatment arranger liability. In fact, this is
the first academic Article to focus on treatment arranger liability
and pinpoint the differences between treatment, as opposed to
disposal arranger liability under CERCLA.
Before examining the specifics of treatment-based arranger
liability, it is first important to understand Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Railway Company, et al. v. United States.10 Burlington
Northern is a 2009 Supreme Court case that has had significant
implications for CERCLA arranger liability.11 The case involved
the sale of numerous hazardous chemicals by Shell Oil Company
(“Shell”) to Brown & Bryant, Inc. (“B & B”) via a common carrier
service.12 Spills and leaks of the chemicals often occurred during
the delivery of these chemicals.13 Shell took notice of this problem,
and took steps in an attempt to diminish the occurrence of spills.14
Even with Shell’s various attempts, B & B continued to conduct
sloppy operations at the site, and eventually became insolvent in
1989.15
The Supreme Court made two important holdings in the
Burlington Northern case,16 but for purposes of this Article
emphasis will be placed on one of these holdings. The Supreme

8. CERCLA § 107(a)(3).
9. See CERCLA § 107(a)(3); Heidi Rasmussen, Re-“Arranging” CERCLA
Liability: What is the State of Arranger Liability Post-Burlington Northern Santa Fe
Railroad Company v. United States, 45 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 381, 382–83 (2015); Marc P.
Lawrence, To Arrange or Not to Arrange: Intent is the Question, MICH. B.J., Oct.
2009, at 48; Alexandra E. Shea, CERCLA Arranger Liability and the Intent to Dispose
of Hazardous Waste, FED. LAW., July 2012, at 42.
10. 556 U.S. 599 (2009).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 602–03.
13. Id. at 604.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 604–05.
16. The other holding—which has equal, if not greater implications—upholds the
use of proportioning cost for a responsible party in certain cases. Id. at 613–15. The
Court reasoned that the defendant can avoid joint and several liability if—and only if—
they can prove that a “reasonable basis for apportionment exists.” Id. at 614. In
contrast, if multiple causes create a single, indivisible harm, joint and several liability is
applied—thus all defendants are held liable for the entire harm. Id. at 614–15. In this
case, the Supreme Court upheld apportionment of nine percent for the railroad
company. Id. at 618–19.
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Court opined that Shell was not liable for arranging for the disposal
of hazardous substances under CERCLA § 107(a).17 The Court
began its analysis by asserting that if a party enters into a
transaction for the sole purpose of discarding a no longer useful
hazardous substance, that party is clearly liable under CERCLA §
107(a).18 This a clear-cut instance of a PRP arranging for the
disposal of a hazardous substance.19 On the other end of the
spectrum, if a party sells a new and useful product and that product
later—unbeknownst to the original seller—causes contamination
during disposal, there is no liability to the seller under 107(a).20
What remains unclear is assignment of liability when the seller has
knowledge of the contamination, but the seller’s intent is
unknown.21 The Court determined that in such cases, arranging for
disposal liability “requires a fact intensive inquiry that looks
beyond the parties’ characterization of the transaction as a
‘disposal’ or a ‘sale’ and seeks to discern whether the arrangement
was one Congress intended to fall within the scope of CERCLA’s
strict-liability provisions.”22 This new approach has constrained the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) ability to bring
enforcement actions against arrangers for disposal, as the requisite
intent is significantly harder to demonstrate than the mere
knowledge that eventual disposal would indeed take place.
This Article utilizes the Burlington Northern framework and
other case law to analyze the meaning of the phrase “arranged
for . . . treatment” within CERCLA § 107(a)(3).23 Specifically, this
Article intends to answer the following questions: (1) why did
Congress include this phrase; (2) what types of transactions did
Congress intend to have liability attach to the transferor; and (3)
whether courts analyze “arranged for . . . treatment” similarly or
differently than “arranged for disposal,” which is also in CERCLA
§ 107(a)(3).24 This Article will survey CERCLA Congressional
records and the few instances that courts have scrutinized
treatment arranger liability, in order to better construe how EPA—
17. Id. at 613.
18. Id. at 609–10.
19. See id.
20. Id.; see Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome Inc., 189 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1999);
see also Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Charmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir.
1990).
21. Burlington, 556 U.S. at 610.
22. Id.
23. See CERCLA § 107(a)(3).
24. CERCLA § 107(a)(3).
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and private parties involved in CERCLA contribution claims—can
utilize the term treatment in select enforcement actions.
This Article will ultimately conclude that: (1) Congress
included this phrase because treatment of hazardous substances
inherently generates the possibility of Superfund sites; (2) Congress
intended liability to attach to the transferor anytime the selling
party intends—whether implicitly or explicitly—to alter the
hazardous substance through some process to make it more useful
or reuseable, and that process was the proximate cause of the
release of hazardous waste at the site; and (3) while some courts
have analyzed the terms treatment and disposal within the same
analysis—provided they are not mutually exclusive terms—it is
evident that attaching liability under the treatment term is an easier
standard to meet and would result in an increased percentage of
successful CERCLA enforcement actions and contribution claims.
This Article provides two classic real-world scenarios as examples
to shed light on situations that treatment arranger liability could
and should be utilized as a litigation tactic.
I.

DEFINITION OF “TREATMENT”

To begin, CERCLA § 107(a)(3), which provides the term
“arranged for . . . treatment,” states in full:
[A]ny person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a
transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or
operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances . . . .25

The term treatment in CERCLA 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29), is
defined the same way as it is under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (“RCRA”) § 1004(34).26

25. CERCLA § 107(a)(3) (emphasis added).
26. See CERCLA § 101(29) (“The terms ‘disposal,’ [sic] ‘hazardous waste,’ [sic]
and ‘treatment’ shall have the meaning provided in section 1004 of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. § 6903].”); 42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (2012) (establishing, through
RCRA, a statutory scheme for waste management and disposal of hazardous wastes; it
was enacted in 1976, was a precursor to CERCLA, and thus Congress utilized pieces of
the program in enacting CERCLA; the difference between the two statutes is that
CERCLA emphasizes historic and abandoned sites, while RCRA’s scheme is focused
on currently active facilities as well as future facilities that will need to dispose of
hazardous wastes). See also EPA History: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-history-resource-
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The term ‘treatment’, when used in connection with hazardous
waste, means any method, technique, or process, including
neutralization, designed to change the physical, chemical, or
biological character or composition of any hazardous waste so
as to neutralize such waste or so as to render such waste
nonhazardous, safer for transport, amendable for recovery,
amenable for storage, or reduced in volume. Such term
includes any activity or processing designed to change the
physical form or chemical composition of hazardous waste so as
to render it nonhazardous.27

This definition requires some procedure be conducted to the
hazardous waste,28 which changes or alters it to be safer or more
useful. For instance, if Party A sends a used natural resource to
Party B, and Party B separates the useful resource from what was
not useful, Party B’s separation would constitute treatment under
the RCRA definition that was adopted by CERCLA. If Party B’s
operation and treatment of said natural resource causes
contamination to the property, then Party A would be liable under
CERCLA since it “arranged for . . . treatment.”29
II.

ANALYSIS OF “TREATMENT”

A. Legislative History of “Treatment”
The legislative history demonstrates that Congress was aware
that when hazardous substances are treated, they have the
potential to cause a release, disposal, or other contamination that
may lead to the eventual creation of Superfund sites.30 Therefore,
arranging for treatment necessitates the strict liability that the
CERCLA statutory scheme provides in cases where the PRP
cannot demonstrate the need for apportionment. The legislative
history also implements a shorthand definition of treatment, getting

conservation-and-recovery-act [https://perma.cc/J6RC-QZZ3] (last updated Jan. 5,
2016) (explaining that RCRA was created to protect “human health and the
environment from the potential hazards of waste disposal” and reduce the amount of
generated waste while conserving natural resources and energy).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (2012).
28. It should be noted that the RCRA definition utilizes the term “hazardous
waste,” rather than “hazardous substance,” which is utilized throughout CERCLA.
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (2012), with CERCLA § 107(a)(3).
29. CERCLA § 107(a)(3). See infra Part III for more in-depth hypotheticals.
30. See ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION, A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND), PUBLIC LAW 96-510,
VOL. 1 (1983).
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at the heart of the Congressional intent.31
Within CERCLA’s legislative history, Congresswoman Niki
Tsongas of Massachusetts asserted that for the “purposes of this
[A]ct, Congress declares the manufacture, use, transportation,
treatment, storage, disposal, and release of hazardous substances
are ultrahazardous activities.”32 This lends some support to the
conclusion that Congress intended to utilize the term treatment
within CERCLA to protect against the numerous liabilities
associated with the treatment processes. More importantly, it
provides evidence that treatment and disposal are not two separate
acts with differing levels of CERCLA liability, but are equally
“hazardous acts” in the eyes of Congress.33
Additionally, within a RCRA Senate Report Summary, the
term treatment was defined as “any process which changes the
character of waste so as to render it amendable to further use or
storage.”34 This Senate Report effectively took the definition of
treatment from RCRA and condensed it further, demonstrating
some Congressional intent or support for this definition.35
However, unlike RCRA’s definition of treatment, which uses the
word amendable as well as amenable, this Senate Report uses only
the word amendable.36
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. See id. The statements made by Tsongas were not refuted by any other
member of Congress during the hearing on CERCLA. Id.
34. S. REP. NO. 94-988, at 25 (1976).
35. See id. It should be noted that there was nothing within the Senate Report
that refuted the use of this definition.
36. The words have different definitions, and thus convey different meanings.
Amenable is defined as “capable of submission,” “readily brought to yield, submit, or
cooperate,” or “willing.” Amenable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE
(2015), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/amenable [https://perma.cc/H7L4RW5A]. Interestingly, the primary definition of “amenable” is “liable to be brought to
account,” which does not fit well into the framework of CERCLA. Id. On the other
hand, amend is “to put right,” or “to change or modify for the better.” Amendable,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY
ONLINE,
(2015),
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/amendable [https://perma.cc/QPJ4-HHHH]. The definitions
are similar, but it is intriguing, as some courts have emphasized amendable rather than
amenable in their CERCLA treatment analysis. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.
v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1992) (utilizing
amendable when quoting RCRA for the definition of treatment and subsequently using
the term in its analysis on whether a battery generator/recycler treated the batteries
when breaking them open). This may be because the word amendable linguistically fits
the RCRA definition of treatment better than amenable. The treatment of a
hazardous substance is relative to “reform[ing]” or “chang[ing] or modify[ing] for the
better,” rather than making the substance “capable of submission,” or one of the other
amenable definitions that feel out of place within the definition of treatment.
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B. How Courts Define “Treatment”
Courts have defined treatment in a multitude of ways, such as
making a hazardous substance useable again,37 recovering the
usable material from the hazardous substance,38 merely reducing
the hazardous substance in volume, any neutralization process,39
and any processing of already discarded hazardous substances or
processing that resulted in such discard.40 This section examines
numerous courts’ analyses in greater detail; however, there is a
broad array of possible definitions that can be conditioned to meet
different sets of fact patterns. The takeaway is that any analysis has
included some type of altering of the hazardous substance.
In United States v. Pesses, defendants sent unusable scrap
metal to a facility, which was treated and later disposed of at
another site.41 The unusable scrap metal was a by-product that was
not usable as intended and was then processed to be made suitable
for said use once again.42 The court concluded that treatment
occurred by the processes used to make the metal useable once
again.43 The processes included “melt[ing], shear[ing], clean[ing],
crush[ing], saw[ing], band[ing], drill[ing], tapp[ing], briquett[ing],
and/or bal[ing] it.”44 The court noted that there clearly was
treatment and disposal evident, as per their RCRA definitions.45
In Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co.,
defendants sent spent lead acid batteries for recycling at a lead
reclamation operator.46 While mentioning disposal, the court here
clearly held that the defendants arranged for treatment of the lead,

Amendable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, (2015), http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/amendable; Amenable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY
ONLINE (2015), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/amenable [https://perma
.cc/H7L4-RW5A].
37. United States v. Pesses, 794 F. Supp. 151, 156–57 (W.D. Pa. 1992).
38. California v. Summer del Caribe, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 577, 580 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
39. Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, T & D R.R., 142 F.3d 769, 774 (4th Cir.
1998); Douglass County v. Gould, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1242, 1244, (D. Neb. 1994).
40. 142 F.3d at 774.
41. Pesses, 794 F. Supp. at 156–57.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 154.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 156. In the wake of the Burlington Northern decision, the disposal
analysis here, and in most of the future cases to be covered within this Article may be
outdated in part. This specific decision, however, may not have bearing on a CERCLA
treatment analysis.
46. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp.
1269 (E.D. Va. 1992).
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falling under CERCLA liability.47 Moreover, within a footnote, the
Eastern District of Virginia noted the definition of treatment
within RCRA, but more specifically that the company’s process of
breaking open batteries changed the characteristics of the waste
“so as to render such waste . . . amendable for recovery.”48
In a later decision, the Northern District of California in
California v. Summer del Caribe, Inc. determined that RCRA
regulations define treatment to include “any process . . .
designed . . . so as to recover . . . material resources from the
waste.”49
Defendant, here, was a can manufacturer, the
manufacturing of which generates solder dross.50 The defendant
was capable of reclaiming and reusing one-third of the solder, or
metals, while two-thirds contained “high levels of lead and zinc
compounds.”51 The defendant sold the solder dross to a metal
reclamation facility, which reclaimed the reusable portion while
storing the hazardous portion in drums on the reclamation site.52
The drums became corroded over time, resulting in creation of a
Superfund site.53 The court went on to hold that treatment was
evident in this case since the process of refinement utilized by the
defendant was intended to “recover material resources from
waste.”54 This decision, although dating back to 1993, looks to the
intent of the transaction by the PRP, which would certainly pass
muster under the Burlington Northern framework for arranger
liability.55 It should be noted that the court’s holding was not
limited to treatment arranger liability, as the defendant arranged
for disposal as well.56
In Catellus Development Corporation v. United States, the
defendant sold depleted and no longer useful automobile batteries

47. Id. at 1275–76.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (2012); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., at 1275 n.7
(E.D. Va. 1992).
49. California v. Summer del Caribe, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 577, 580 n.3 (N.D. Cal.
1993) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 260.10).
50. Id. at 577.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Summer del Caribe, 821 F. Supp. at 580 n.3 (quoting Pesses, 794 F. Supp. at
157).
55. Id.; see generally Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S.
599 (2009) (holding that in order to find a PRP liable as an arranger for disposal, there
must be demonstrated proof that the PRP intended to arrange for disposal).
56. Summer del Caribe, 821 F. Supp. at 581.
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to a battery cracking plant.57 Lead was subsequently extracted
from the batteries at the plant, and the batteries were then
disposed of at plaintiff’s property.58
The property became
contaminated with lead, becoming a Superfund site.59 The court
held that there was no treatment arranger liability here because the
sale by defendant of the batteries had neither contractual condition
pertaining to said treatment, nor had the defendant retained any
ownership interest in the batteries once they were sold to the
plant.60
The important aspect of the Catellus district court decision was
that Congress clearly intended the terms treatment and disposal to
be separate, thus necessitating separate analyses.61 Provided that
there is little legislative history, any analysis on this is premised on
treatment and disposal being two separate terms listed under
arranger liability within CERCLA § 107(a)(3).62 However, the
Catellus district court looked to RCRA for the definition of
treatment summarizing it as “necessarily involv[ing] more than a
mere transfer of possession and connot[ing] some process designed
to alter the character or composition of a product.”63 On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit Catellus court looked to the RCRA definition,
utilizing only a piece of the definition for the purposes of this case,
“amenable for recovery . . . or reduced in volume,” which is relative
to the Eastern District of Virginia court’s use within Chesapeake.64
The circuit court upheld the decision on treatment arranger
liability, but on different grounds that will be discussed further
within Section C.
The court in Douglass County v. Gould, Inc. summarized
treatment under RCRA to be defined as “the process of
neutralizing a hazardous substance,” concluding that this was not
the intention of the transaction, which was to sell used plates from
spent batteries.65 The buyer then used the plates in its smelting

57. Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 828 F. Supp. 764, 766 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 773.
61. Id. at 772–73.
62. See CERCLA § 107(a)(3).
63. Catellus, 828 F. Supp. at 773.
64. Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 1994); see also
42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (2012); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal
Co., 814 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1992).
65. Douglass County v. Gould, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Neb. 1994).
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operation, which became a Superfund site.66 The problem with the
analysis in this case was that the court paid no attention to the
following phrases within the treatment definition, “amendable for
recovery, amenable for storage, or reduced in volume.”67 While, it
is appropriate that the court wanted to give increased attention to
the term neutralizing, this is not the only way to define treatment
within CERCLA.
In Chatham Steel Corp. v. Brown, defendants—consisting of
battery shops, scrap yards, and battery brokers—sold batteries by
the pound to a reclamation site.68 Without mentioning specific
language, the Northern District of Florida, held that “[t]he process
of breaking open the batteries, recovering the lead groups, washing
the lead, and disposing of the acid and battery casings amounted to
‘treatment’ of a hazardous substance as defined by CERCLA.”69
This is in stark contrast to the Douglass opinion.
In Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, the Central District of
Utah also looked to the RCRA definition of treatment, concluding
that the “extensive chemical reworking” of used oil clearly
constituted treatment of a hazardous waste under CERCLA.70 The
defendants in this case sent used motor oil to a refinery to be
recycled.71 The process of the treatment changed in 1982, but the
following was deemed treatment by this court:
after the oil was heated, it was subjected to a distillation process
to separate the oil into its various components. During . . .
distillation, clay was used to removed [sic] carbon from the oil
and to improve its color. Given the extensive chemical
reworking of the used oil at the Ekotek plant, it is impossible to
say that these processes did not constitute treatment of
hazardous waste within the meaning of CERCLA.72

In Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, T & D R.R., a company
operated a railroad parts foundry, and entered into contracts with
defendants to buy their used wheel bearings in order to process
them into new bearings.73 The process included the melting of the

66. Id.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (2012).
68. Chatham Steel Corp. v. Brown, 858 F. Supp. 1130, 1135–36 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
69. Id. at 1141.
70. Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 881 F. Supp. 1516, 1528 (C.D. Utah 1995)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, T & D R.R., 142 F.3d 769, 772–73 (4th
Cir. 1998).
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metals that make up the bearings, resulting in impurities separating
from the bearings.74 The court held that the transactional intent of
both parties was to have the bearings reused in their entirety, and
thus the transaction was not covered under CERCLA.75
Nonetheless, the court determined that Congress intended no
other definition of treatment than what was in RCRA, or they
would have provided a new definition of treatment within
CERCLA itself.76 The court held that the plain meaning of the
term “arranging for . . . treatment”77 “shall have the same meaning
provided in section 1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act,”78 which
provides, “a party arranging for the processing of discarded
hazardous substance or processing resulting in the discard of
hazardous substances.”79 This definition is broader than other
courts have used, as this would include processing of a substance
that was not hazardous, but becomes so as a result of the given
process. With this definition in mind, the question within the case
then became whether the transaction was for the discard of
hazardous substances or the sale of “valuable materials.”80 This
analysis has been used in the past for arranging for disposal, and is
here being used for arranging for treatment. In its Burlington
Northern opinion, the Supreme Court referenced Pneumo Abex in
a positive light, but the reference did not endorse the treatment
analysis per se.81
C. “Intent” to “Arrange for Treatment”
To be found liable as an arranger for treatment, there must be
a demonstration of the party’s intent for the hazardous substance
74. Id. at 772.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 774.
77. CERCLA § 107(a)(3).
78. Pneumo Abex, 142 F.3d at 774.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 775.
81. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 610 (2009).
“[T]he determination whether an entity is an arranger requires a fact-intensive inquiry
that looks beyond the parties’ characterization of the transaction as a ‘disposal’ or a
‘sale’ and seeks to discern whether the arrangement was one Congress intended to fall
within the scope of CERCLA’s strict-liability provisions.” Id. See also Freeman v.
Glaxo Wellcome Inc., 189 F.3d. 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1999); Pneumo Abex,142 F.3d at 775.
“[T]here is no bright line between a sale and a disposal under CERCLA. A party’s
responsibility . . . must by necessity turn on a fact-specific inquiry into the nature of the
transaction.” United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1354
(ND Ill. 1992); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Charmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1318
(11th Cir. 1990).
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to be treated, whether or not this specific intent was explicit within
the transaction. Most recently, in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
Renz,82 the court referenced how treatment should be analyzed in
arranger liability cases after Burlington Northern.83 This case dealt
with commercial property that was leased to numerous dry cleaners
between the years of 1975 to 2008.84 The site was contaminated
with perchloroethylene (“PCE”), which is a chemical used in dry
cleaning operations.85 The defendants contended that the claims
made by plaintiff were based on arranging for treatment, as
opposed to disposal.86 The court discussed within a footnote that
Burlington Northern,
[i]n examining the “ordinary meaning” of the words contained
in the statute, the Court noted that “the word ‘arrange’ implies
action directed to a specific purpose[.]”
Based on this
interpretation, the Court extrapolated that the term “arranged”
as used in the phrase “arranged for disposal or treatment,” 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3), requires a showing of “intentional steps”
by the putative PRP. In addition, the Court reasoned that mere
knowledge of disposal or treatment is not sufficient to establish
an intention. Thus, while it is true that the Burlington court was
discussing the meaning of “arranged” in the context of
“disposal,” the Court’s reasoning and logic thus apply equally to
the term “treatment.”87

The court here went further to analyze treatment using the
same tests as it would for disposal. It determined that the Supreme
Court in Burlington Northern was looking to define the word
arrange in relation to that of disposal or treatment, and thus the
requisite mind frame to arrange—that of intent—is the same for
either of the two.88 Whether this is correct or not, certainly is a
point of contention that was not clarified within the Supreme
Court’s Burlington Northern decision.
Prior to Wells Fargo, the court in Chatham Steel came to a
similar conclusion—although notably prior to the Burlington
Northern decision.89 The court found defendants liable for
arranging for disposal and treatment when the PRP made the
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Renz, 795 F. Supp. 2d 898 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
Id. at 920.
Id. at 903.
Id.
Id. at 921.
Id. at 921–22, n.14 (citations omitted).
Id.
See Chatham Steel Corp. v. Brown, 858 F. Supp. 1130, 1143 (N.D. Fla. 1994).

438

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:425

“crucial decision” to sell batteries to a recycling facility in the first
place, making the decision as to “when, and by whom the
hazardous substances would be treated or disposed.”90
The Eastern District of California in California Dept. of Toxic
Substances v. Interstate Non-Ferrous Corp. also found a defendant
liable as an arranger for treatment, when the sole purpose of the
transaction was to treat the “valuable components” of the
product.91 In this case, the defendant truck parts company brought
scrap material, including battery parts, to a smelter for recovery of
lead.92 The defendant retained ownership of the battery parts
throughout the process of the treatment.93
More interestingly, the Ninth Circuit opined that there is no
requirement in treatment cases that there be a contract stating how
and what treatment will occur.94 The court held “all that is
necessary is that the treatment be inherent in the particular
arrangement.”95 In other words, a court can find intent to treat a
hazardous substance even when it is implicit, rather than explicitly
laid out by the parties involved. There is a limit to a finding of
intent, as the court in Pnuemo Abex concluded that the intent of
both parties in the relevant transactions was for the product to be
reused in its entirety, thus the transaction was not covered under
CERCLA arranger liability.96
In Pneumo Abex defendants
entered a transaction with Abex Corporation where defendants
were to give Abex Corporation old wheel bearings in order for the
Corporation to reuse the entirety of the metals to construct new
wheel bearings and return to defendants.97
When Abex
Corporation’s process resulted in the creation of a Superfund site,
defendants were not held liable as there was no intent by
defendants to enter into the contract that would result in such.98
The Circuit Court in Catellus introduced a caveat to treatment
arranger liability, holding that CERCLA requires the treatment to
take place at the specific facility at which are the hazardous
90. Id.
91. Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Interstate Non-Ferrous Corp., 298
F. Supp. 2d 930, 964 (E.D Cal. 2003).
92. Id. at 942.
93. Id. at 944.
94. Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 1994).
95. Id.
96. Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, T & D R.R., 142 F.3d 769, 775 (4th Cir.
1998).
97. See id.
98. Id.
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substances that are subject to the cleanup action.99 In this case it
was the eventual arrangement for disposal at Site B that lead to
contamination, not the arrangement for treatment at the
intermediary, Site A.100 In other words, Party X is not liable when
arranging for treatment of a hazardous substance at Facility A if
Facility A treats the substance, then takes that substance and
arranges for disposal at Facility B that thereafter becomes a
Superfund site. If treatment cases were to become more prominent
within CERCLA claims, this could be another point of contention
that has the potential to create a circuit split. The argument against
this is that even though the hazardous substance was not disposed
of on-site, Party X still had the requisite mindset to have the
substance treated with full knowledge and intent that the resulting
hazardous waste would be discarded or disposed of by Party Y
somewhere, whether it be on that site or another owned by a third
party.
D. Useful Product Defense
The useful product defense is available to PRPs when the
hazardous substance sold can be utilized for its original purpose.101
Courts have disagreed on the specifics of this defense, especially
when the sold product was not considered a “hazardous waste” at
the time of the sale. This is especially true in cases for mining
property where the hazardous waste was not present until after the
mining operation began or concluded.102
The court in Summer del Caribe, Inc., characterized the useful
product defense as only applicable when there is a sale of a new
product, manufactured specifically for sale and used for its ordinary
purpose.103 The defense has been readily rejected by courts when
the purpose of the sale is to treat or get rid of a waste or byproduct.104
The Northern District of Florida, in Chatham Steel, disagreed
with the Catellus district court analysis, which had looked to a
99. Catellus, 34 F.3d at 753.
100. Id.
101. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 609–10
(2009).
102. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 832 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (E.D.
Wash. 2011).
103. Summer del Caribe, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 574, 581 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
104. Id.; see also United States v. Pesses, 794 F. Supp. 151 (W.D. Pa. 1992)
(explaining that CERCLA liability can attach to those who do not own or control the
material, as liability attaches also to those who arranged for treatment or disposal).
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product’s “productive use” rather than whether it was a “useful
product.”105 As per the Chatham Steel case, a product could be of
“productive use” for recycling, although not a “useful product” in
terms of the originally intended purpose of the product.106 The
court in Chatham Steel decided to utilize the useful product
analysis from Pesses and Chesapeake, rather than the Catellus
district court test.107
In Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., the court—in a
post Burlington Northern analysis—explained that the useful
product defense does not apply if the plaintiff can show that the
product or substance transacted for “has the characteristic of waste
at the time it is delivered to another party.”108 The court
distinguished the Cadillac Fairview and Catellus Circuit Court
treatment analyses by explaining that the transactions within those
cases involved a product, which had the “characteristic of waste” at
the point of delivery.109
In Pakootas, plaintiff Teck Cominco alleged that the State of
Washington qualified as an arranger when it leased public lands for
ore mining, a process that generated waste rock and tailings.110 The
court concluded that there was a valid useful product defense here,
since the mines “did not have the ‘characteristic of waste’” until the
plaintiff mined them to produce such waste.111 In Cadillac
Fairview, the product sold was previously contaminated styrene,112
while in Catellus it was spent batteries.113 The court concluded that
since the mines were not a “hazardous waste when the State
entered into the contracts,” the purpose of the State in the
contracts could not have been “to dispose of or treat hazardous

105. Catellus, 828 F. Supp. at 766; Chatham Steel Corp. v. Brown, 858 F. Supp.
1130, 1141 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
106. Chatham Steel, 858 F. Supp. at 1141.
107. Id.
108. Pakootas, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 1273 (quoting Team Enters., LLC v. W. Inv.
Real Estate Tr., 647 F. 3d 901, 909 (9th Cir. 2011)).
109. Id. at 1277.
110. Id. at 1270.
111. Id. at 1277, 1281; see Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. United States, 41
F.3d 562 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Catellus, 828 F. Supp. at 766.
112. “Styrene is used predominately in the production of polystyrene plastics and
resins. Styrene is also used as an intermediate in the synthesis of materials used for ion
exchange resins and to produce copolymers.” Styrene Fact Sheet, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/airtoxics/hlthef/styrene.html [https://perma.cc/JHM32S8S] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
113. Id.; Catellus, 828 F. Supp. at 764–65.
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waste.”114 Treatment by the mining companies was the peripheral
result of a new and unused product.115
The court in Pakootas clearly misunderstood the purpose of
the CERCLA statute when coming to its decision on the matter of
treatment and disposal.116 As Teck Cominco asserted in its brief,
the State arranged for treatment and disposal of hazardous waste
when it leased the land, as the “waste in the form of tailings and
waste rock is inherent to the mining and milling processes,” which
the State intended Teck Cominco to perform.117 The State
intended to enter into the contract so that Teck Cominco would
separate the ore from the waste rock and treat the ore, which
generated tailings that were disposed of.118 There is no other
purpose for the State to lease the mines to Teck Cominco than to
arrange for the mining, which results in the treatment and
subsequent disposal of hazardous waste.119 This is not a case of
mere knowledge by the defendant, but rather one where intent is
implicit within the transaction.120 Even if the court asserted that
there was no hazardous waste to treat, it must at least admit that
the contract arranged for the disposal of future waste at the site.
More in line with a typical useful product analysis, the Ekotek
court claimed that the “defense focuses only upon whether the
product is still fit for its original purpose.”121 The standard applies
to not just disposal, but also treatment as well,122 and could easily
be applied to the necessary processing of a mineral at a refinery.
E. Retention of Ownership
To be held liable for arranging for the disposal or treatment of
a hazardous substance it does not matter whether the liable party
“retain[ed] ownership of the materials” they shipped away or sold,
or whether they had control of the handling or storage by the
treating or disposing party.123 In sum, a party can be liable as an
arranger for treatment even if it did not receive any materials back
after the treatment occurred.
Ownership of the hazardous
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 832 F. Supp. 2d at 1281.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1271 n.2.
See id. at 1270.
See id.
Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 881 F. Supp. 1516, 1527 (C.D. Utah 1995).
Id.
United States v. Pesses, 794 F. Supp. 151, 157 (W.D. Pa. 1992).

442

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:425

substance after treatment is covered under a different CERCLA
liability analysis.124
The court in Cadillac Fairview held that for arranger liability
to attach, it does not matter if the arranger owned the hazardous
substance, or was the one who disposed of or treated it, but merely
that the person or entity arranged for treatment or disposal.125 The
court used the terms disposal and treatment interchangeably within
this analysis, as the emphasis was more on the word arrange.126 In
agreement, the court in Summer del Caribe explained that a person
or company could be liable even when it did not own and decide
how to specifically treat or dispose of said product.127 The only
factor necessary to attach liability is a party’s intended treatment or
disposal when the product was sold.128
III.

REAL WORLD SCENARIOS

There are many different real-world scenarios that can call for
the use of a treatment arranger argument; however, for purposes of
this Article, I propose two examples that demonstrate such. The
main point is that treatment arranger liability may be easier to
argue in some cases than that of disposal arranger liability.
A. Battery Casings
Party A is an auto parts store (“Store A”), which received
automotive batteries from customers via trade-ins.129 Store A’s
policy for dealing with these spent batteries was to crack them
open, and then to sell them to a battery cracking plant operated by
Company B.130 Company B then extracted and smelted the lead
from the batteries, taking on ownership and control of these
batteries.131 Company B then washed and crushed the battery
casings, to be stored on a truck to be dumped on another end of the
property owned by Company B. The casings contained lead,
124. See CERCLA § 107(a).
125. Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 565 (9th Cir.
1994).
126. See id.
127. California v. Summer del Caribe, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 574, 581 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
128. Id.
129. A majority of the facts presented within this scenario derive from case law,
with few changes. See generally Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748 (9th
Cir. 1994).
130. See id. at 749.
131. See id. at 749–50.
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contaminating the property that soon became a Superfund site.
EPA issued a unilateral administrative order under CERCLA §
106(a) for Company B to cleanup the site, which it did.132
The present case has arisen out of a contribution action taken
by Company B under CERCLA § 113(f) to mitigate its impact
from joint and several liability under CERCLA.133 The premise
here is that Company B could assert that Store A entered into a
contractual relationship in order to dispose of the hazardous
substance, which it did effectively. The problem with this argument
is that it is much harder to demonstrate to a court of law that Store
A had the intent to dispose of the hazardous substance, as it could
argue that the contract was for the sale of a useful product, and that
if anything, they had knowledge of the eventual disposal of the lead
inside. The more effective litigation tactic here would be to assert
that Store A entered into the transactions with Company B
intending for Company B to treat the batteries, as there are
minimal uses that Company B can conjure up for spent car
batteries. The treatment here takes place whenever Company B
engages in any actions to the batteries, which effectively separates
the non-hazardous from the hazardous substance or diminishes the
hazardous substances within, or connected to the non-hazardous
substances in any respect.134
B. Transformer/Barrel Reconditioning
Another instance where an arranger treatment analysis would
be practical is where Company A transacts with Company B to
recondition or repair transformers,135 barrels, or some other
132. Pursuant to CERCLA § 106(a) a unilateral administrative order works as
follows:
In addition to any other action taken by a State or local government, when the
President determines that there may be an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility, he
may require the Attorney General of the United States to secure such relief as
may be necessary to abate such danger or threat, and the district court of the
United States in the district in which the threat occurs shall have jurisdiction
to grant such relief as the public interest and the equities of the case may
require. The President may also, after notice to the affected State, take other
action under this section including, but not limited to, issuing such orders as
may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the environment.
CERCLA § 106(a).
133. CERCLA § 113(f).
134. See supra Part I.
135. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Ga. Power Co., 781 F.3d 129, 144 (4th Cir. 2015)
(The type of transformer being referenced “‘step[s] down’ the voltage of electricity as it
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product in order for Company A to then reuse said product. For
example, a transformer is filled with oil, in order to keep all of the
parts lubricated and properly working.136 When delivering the
transformers they are often stripped of “free flowing oil,” leaving a
coating of oil on the inside edges.137 The oils within the transformer
may, and often do, contain polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCB”), as
was the case in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Georgia Power Co.138
During repair of the transformer, PCBs could leak out and create a
Superfund site.139
The key to this is that the reconditioning desired by Company
A was with the intent that Company B remove any hazardous
substance from the product, such as PCB liquids lining the
product.140 The act of removing the hazardous substance is
treatment under CERCLA, and therefore Company A should be
found liable if Company B’s property becomes a Superfund site.
Intent for disposal of that same hazardous substance is further
attenuated from the purpose of the transaction than was the
treatment of the product; therefore the easier argument to make is
for CERCLA treatment arranger liability. It should be noted that
this may not work in a case like Consolidation Coal, where the
power company sold the PCB contaminated transformers as a
useful product, as there is no requisite intent to have the PCBs
themselves disposed of, or even treated, for that matter.141
CONCLUSION
In the end, a CERCLA treatment analysis is different from
that of disposal, and the legislative intent coupled with case law
clearly differentiates the two terms. The definition of treatment
under RCRA includes a vast array of situations, encompassing
anytime a seller of a product intends for the product to be treated
in some capacity, whether it be by separating the hazardous waste

moves from power plants to end users. . . . [T]ypically contains an enclosed, vacuumsealed external tank, an internal iron core, and coils consisting of copper or aluminum
windings wrapped in cellulose insulation that tightly surround the core.”).
136. Id. at 144.
137. Id. at 145.
138. Id. at 144.
139. See id.
140. See generally Consolidation Coal, 781 F.3d 129 (holding by way of a strict
arrange for disposal analysis that the seller of transformers was not liable for sale to a
second party who then reconditioned and sold to others, creating a Superfund site at
the reconditioning party’s property).
141. See id.
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from the non-hazardous, or by making the waste “amenable for
recovery, amenable for storage, or reduced in volume.”142 The
seller does not need to have control over the treatment of the
hazardous waste. The purpose of the arranger provision within
CERCLA § 107(a) is not just to find a party liable for arranging for
the disposal of a hazardous substance that results in a hazardous
waste spill, but to also hold such a party liable if they arrange for
treatment of a hazardous substance at a facility. As there are
currently few CERCLA treatment arranger related cases, an
increase would result in an increase in successful enforcement
actions. A multitude of successful treatment arranger cases has the
potential to speed up the litigation process in the short term, and
culminate in a boost in settlements with PRPs in the long term.

142.

42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (2012).

